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CHAPTER IV 
SEMI-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
1. GENERAL 
One of the outstanding features of a totalitarian 
state is the facility with which governmental agencies 
can be applied to military effort. During World 
War II, all agencies of the U. S. S. R. and the Com· 
munist Party were devoted, in varying degree, to 
military purposes. 
The transition of agencies and individuals be-
tween civil and military positions within the Soviet 
Union has always been extremely fluid. A number 
of semiofficial bodies, commissariats, and main ad-
ministrations were, however, specifically brought 
into the military structure during World War II. 
These organizations included those temporarily in-
corporated into the Red Army or Navy, those given 
the status of armed forces, those legally militarized, 
and the Partisans. 
2. AGENCIES INCORPORATED INTO ARMY AND 
NAVY 
The most important agencies temporarily incorpo-
rated into the Red Army and Navy were the Main 
Administrations of the Civil Air Fleet, the Hydro-
Meteorological Service, and the Northern Sea Route. 
In addition, the Main Administration for Universal 
Compulsory Military Training of the Citizens of the 
U. S. S. R. (Vsevobuch) was organized in 1941 to 
place the semiofficial and voluntary training activi-
ties carried on by the national Organization for the 
Defense of the Soviet Union and Defense against 
Air Raids and Chemical Attack (Osoaviakhim) un-
der military control and on a compulsory basis. 
3. AGENCIES GIVEN ARMED FORCE STATUS 
Even before World War II, troops of the Peoples' 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) had the 
legal status of an armed force equivalent to the Red 
Army and Navy. Its authority was extensive. It 
maintained border guards and strategic security 
forces, controlled all local police and fire depart-
ments, conducted foreign espionage, and conducted 
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counterespionage among the civil population and in 
the army and the navy. 
The Soviet government carefully controlled the 
functions of the NKVD. The Army was made re-
sponsible for its own internal security in 1943. 
Secret domestic counterespionage and foreign espio· 
nage functions were given to the newly organized 
Peoples' Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). 
The NKGB also was given the status of an armed 
force. 
4. AGENCIES LEGALLY MILITARIZED 
Because the operation of transportation and signal 
communications systems had to be coordinated 
closely with the requirements of the Red Army and 
Navy, the Soviet government legally militarized the 
Commissariats of Signal Communications, Trans-
portation, Waterways, and the Maritime Fleet. Re-
peated enemy attacks also necessitated their mili-
tarization. Personnel in these organizations were 
subjected to martial authority and, in most instances, 
were given army or navy ranks. They wore special 
uniforms. 
5. PARTISANS 
The organization of the Partisan movement in the 
areas of the U. S. S. R. occupied by the Germans 
and in other countries overrun by German forces is 
the only exception to the rule that the Communist 
Party does not maintain an armed force within the 
Soviet state. 
Early in World War II, the Central ~ommittee of 
the Communist Party directly commanded and ad· 
ministered all Partisan activities through the Com-
mander in Chief of the Partisans. Operational co-
ordination of Partisan activities was taken over by 
the General Headquarters and by army group 
(front) headquarters in the field as the Red Army 
assumed the offensive. Once an area was reoccu-
pied, control over all Partisans was assumed by the 
Chief of Security Troops, who commanded all 
NKVD forces within each army group zone. 
IV-I 
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Occasionally, Partisans in reoccupied areas were 
organized into "destruction battalions" to assist in 
the mopping up of the remnants of German forces. 
All Partisans, however, ultimately were disarmed 
and screened by the NKVD. Some were drafted into 
field replacement units. Some were given respon· 
sible local positions with the NKVD or civilian au-
thorities, and some were sent to the rear as unreliable 
elements. The secret agents of the Occupied Terri-
tories Administration of the NKGB assisted the 
NKVD screen Partisans. 
6. EFFECTIVENESS 
Semi-military organizations generally proved to be 
of marked usefulness in the Soviet war effort. Par-
tisans were of strategic importance in impeding Ger-
man operations. The NKVD and NKGB consoli-
dated the rear area of the Red Army and protected 
the zone of the interior. A considerable number of 
German remnants and isolated dissident groups were 
controlled so effectively that they never interfered 
seriously with military operations. The signal com-
munications and transportation systems of the U. S. 
S. R. were able to accomplish their missions success-
fully despite a partial break-down in the winter and 
spring of 1942 and despite serious shortages. 
In contrast, V sevobuch achieved only limited 
results. The attempt to add training to the total 
productive effort of Soviet civilians required an im-
possibly great effort. Results were achieved only 
for a few critical months and in a few special fields. 
One of the most significant aspects of the Soviet 
employment of semi-military organizations was the 
care exercised to insure effective coordination with 
the strictly military effort, to prevent the growth of 
a vast competing structure, and to avoid duplication 
of effort. 
The State Defense Committee maintained control 
over all semi-military agencies, although the General 
Headquarters directed NKVD, NKGB, and Partisan 
operations. Each organization was charged with 
strictly delimited functions. In several instances, 
notably the NKVD, prewar functions were reduced. 
Thus the NKVD lost its control over army intelli-
gence, counterintelligence, and secret operations. 
It consequently was denied conditions favorable for 
grandiose usurption of the military effort, such as 
was exercised by the SS in Germany. The volun-
te8r Osoaviakhim was relegated to a secondary role 
during World War II. It was supervised strictly by 
the Communist Party so as to prevent its operation 
as the nucleus of any dissident movement. 
IV-2 
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Most semi-military organizations resumed their 
civilian roles with the termination of martial law in 
October 1945. Signal communications and trans-
portation no longer are militarized. Military train-
ing, other than regular recruit training, now is vol-
untary and semiofficial. 
The NKVD and NKGB, however, are of even 
greater importance than during World War II. 
They are insuring the orderly demobilization of the 
army, the effective integration of dischargees into 
the civilian population, and the careful screening of 
the future peacetime army to guarantee its complete 
political reliability. 
Section I. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT 
OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
1. GENERAL 
The Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs 
{NKVD) is responsible for maintenance of the se-
curity of the Soviet Union. 
It conducts frontier and coastal patrols, controls 
all local police and fire departments, maintains spe-
cial mobile forces for use against sabotage or insur-
rection, and is in charge of all prisons. 
The local police functions involve the NKVD in 
the maintenance of internal passport control; birth 
certificates, and other vital statistics. Its control 
over local fire departments gives it over-all control 
of passive antiaircraft defense in time of war. Fi-
nally, the control of prison labor involves the Com-
missariat in extensive construction, mining, and 
development projects. All roads and highways are 
responsibilities of the Commissariat. 
The NKVD is a Union-Republican Commissariat 
and consequently has corresponding organizations 
in the republics. Not all of the main administra-
tions of the Commissariat, however, have counter-
parts in the republics (fig. 1). 
The Main Administration of Border Troops, for 
example, is organized directly into Border Guard 
Districts. Railroad troops and other interior troops 
remain mobile under central control. Although 
prisoners are controlled directly by the Main Admin-
istration of Labor and Prisoner-of-W ar Camps, their 
productive efforts normally are directed by special 
trusts such as Dalstroi, a trust for the economic 
development of the Kolyma area in the Far East. 
Semi-military forces of the NKVD include Border 
Troops, Interior Troops, Signal Troops, Police 
Troops (militia), and Fire Defense Troops. The 
Commissariat's troops normally are selected from re-
liable Party members. Their great strength, at one 
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time well over half a million, attests to the impor-
tance of their activities during World War II. 
2. BORDER AND SECURITY TROOPS 
The Border Troops of the NKVD are charged with 
the supervision and security of the land and sea 
frontier. They are organized into Border Districts 
manned by Border Battalions (fig. 2), whose duties 
include border and coastal patrol, counterespionage 
and customs control. They do not garrison forti-
fications. 
Border Battalions, averaging from 1,000 to 1,200 
in strength, control the First, or Border, Zone of the 
U. S. S. R. The First Zone extends approximately 
9 miles from the actual boundary. Only border 
troops and special construction units are permitted 
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to enter the zone, except at control points. Every 
installation and road is guarded 24 hours a day. 
No movement is permitted at night, except mounted 
or foot patrols accompanied by dogs. 
A Border Battalion's zone is approximately 60 
miles wide, although it may be extended in areas of 
poor communications. Elements of the NKVD Air 
Brigade assist Border Battalions in difficult terrain. 
The Air Brigade is directly subordinate to the Peo-
ples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. It includes a 
number of air regiments and independent squadrons. 
During World War II, the organization of Border 
Troops in theaters of operations was modified. The 
Border Troops were redesignated as Security Troops 
of the Rear Area of the Red Army. They were as-
-----------------
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Figure 2. Organization and deplorment 0/ a NKVD border battalion. 
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signed the mission of apprehension of enemy agents, 
parachute troops, and Red Army stragglers or de-
serters. They also guarded rear area installations 
and maintained straggler lines. The Security Troops 
of the Rear Area of the Red Army were withdrawn 
from the Main Administration of Border Troops and 
placed under separate administrative control. 
The former Border Battalions were organized into 
Security Regiments, subordinate to army groups 
(fronts) and commanded by the Chief of the Secur-
ity Troops of the Rear Area. 
Normally, one Security Regiment was assigned 
to the rear area of each army, and five to six regi-
ments to the rear area of each army group. 
Each Security Regiment consisted of three rifle 
battalions, a machine gun company, a reconnais-
sance company, a submachine gun company, a signal 
communications company, an antitank company, an 
engineer platoon, and maintenance, chemical war-
fare, and transport units. Artillery was attached as 
required. The strength of each regiment was ap-
proximately 1,650 officers and enlisted men. 
3. INTERIOR TROOPS 
The Interior Troops of the NKVD constitute mobile 
forces to insure the security of the state. They in-
clude Operational Troops, Railway Troops, Convoy 
Troops, and Factory Guards. 
Operational Troops are charged with destruction 
of enemy elements in the interior and in the rear of 
the Red Army, suppression of insurrection, and pro-
tection of key installations and individuals. They 
also guard railroads and prisoners when necessary. 
Their organization has been subject to several 
changes. Before World War II, they were organ-
ized into corps, regiments, battalions, and compa-
nies. The corps were reorganized into divisions of 
approximately eight regiments each early in the war, 
Approximately five of the regiments were similar to 
NKVD Security Regiments, organized from Border 
Battalions, one to two were motorized, and one was a 
cavalry regiment. By 1944, the divisions were be-
ing motorized, cavalry largely had been grouped into 
separate divisions, and brigades of two to three 
regiments and two to three separate battalions were 
being organized within each military district. 
At present, the divisions are believed to be 
equipped with tanks and to approach the Red Army 
mechanized corps in size-approximately 15,000 
officers and enlisted men-and in fire power. The 
brigades appear to be flexible semimobile organiza-
tiolli! similar to the Security Regiments. 
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Missions of the divisions and brigades of the 
NKVD are different. The divisions provide a cen· 
tralized mobile force for maintenance of state secu-
rity. During the World War II, they were com-
mitted for operations, particularly anti-Partisan 
actions and mopping up of enemy remnants, in the 
rear of army groups under the army group Chief of 
Security Troops. The brigades, however, provide 
internal security within the military districts. Both 
conduct defensive operations against airborne 
forces. 
The Railway Troops are charged with the defense 
of railroad lines. They employ armored trains and 
cooperate closely with Railroad Station Comman-
dants of the Red Army, who are charged with the de-
fense of terminals, stations, and depots. Railway 
Troops are organized into divisions, brigades, regi-
ments, and separate battalions. Divisions in active 
operational zones have as many as 10 armored 
trains. 
The Convoy Troops protect the movement of 
troops, supplies, and prisoners on the roads, rail-
roads, and waterways. They also insure the unin-
terrupted movement of convoys. Although their 
major functions apply to the zone of the interior, 
their commitment extends to the rear areas of armies. 
Normally, they are concentrated in the zone of main 
effort. Convoy Troops are organized into divisions, 
each containing up to five regiments. 
The Factory Guards provide local and interior 
protection for major industries. 
4. SIGNAL TROOPS 
The Signal Troops of the NKVD were organized in 
1943 as a separate administration directly under the 
Commissariat to improve the communications secu-
rity of the Red Army and of the Peoples' Commis-
sariat of Signal Communications. Their mission 
includes monitoring of both friendly and enemy 
broadcasts, and the establishment, operation, and 
maintenance of signal communication systems for 
staffs and units of the NKVD. 
One Signal Regiment is subordinate to the Chief 
of Security Troops of each army group. Each Sig-
nal Regiment includes three operating battalions and 
two signal construction companies. Its strength is 
approximately 1,000 officers and enlisted men. 
5. POLICE TROOPS 
The Police Troops (militia) of the NKVD are a 
uniformed force to suppress crime and control 
traffic. They also playa major role in state security 
IV-5 
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through comprehensive control of passports and vi-
tal statistics. Police representation on all draft 
boards and in reception centers assures the political 
reliability of all inductees. All changes in resi· 
dence, travel applications, births, and deaths must 
be reported to the police, normally within 24 hours. 
Police control is especially stringent within the 
Second and Third Border Zones. The Second Zone 
extends approximately 60 miles in depth from the 
boundary. All inhabitants in it are examined care-
fully by the police to determine their political relia-
bility. Unreliable elements are sent further into the 
interior. Travel within the Second Zone is permit-
ted only with special passes. 
The Third, or Alertness, Zone extends still deeper. 
The population in this Zone is supervised carefully 
and is specially indoctrinated to cooperate with the 
Police Troops and other agencies of the NKVD in 
the apprehension of suspicious characters. Travel 
in the Third Zone is controlled. 
Police Troops are organized on a Union-Republi-
can basis. Consequently, police headquarters are 
attached to all political subdivisions down to district 
or Oblast level. Police troops are organized into 
regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons. 
Each unit is much larger than corresponding units 
in the Red Army. 
Service in the Police Troops was on a volunteer 
basis prior to 1941. Periods of enlistment were 2 
years. Men who had served in the Red Army con-
stituted the majority of personnel. Volunteers 
could join at 18. They could remain in the 
service and be exempt from military service if 
their performance was satisfactory. Women were 
recruited' extensively for Police Troops during 
World War II. 
6. FIRE DEFENSE TROOPS 
The Main Administration of Fire Defense of the 
NKVD, assisted by the Central Research Institute of 
Fire Defense, controls the Fire Defense Troops. In 
time of peace, they are charged with local fire pro-
tection. 
During World War II, the organization was 
changed into the Main Administration for Passive 
Antiaircraft Defense. The regional counterparts of 
the Main Administration controlled Passive Antiair-
craft Defense G'roups conscripted from local popu· 
lations. They were responsible for preparatory 
measures against air raids, air-raid warning systems, 
camouflage, camouflage discipline, defense against 
chemical attack, damage control, and first aid. 
1V-6 
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The operations of the Main Administration for 
Antiaircraft Defense were integrated closely with 
those of the Main Administration of Antiaircraft 
Defense Forces (GUPVO) of the Red Army, with 
the Osoaviakhim, and with the Commissariats of 
Transportation and Signal Communications. 
The Commander of the operational staff for 
Passive Antiaircraft Defense in each political sub-
division was in direct communication with the 
GUPVO Commander, who was responsible for the 
active fighter and antiaircraft defense of the area. 
The visual observation systems of Passive Antiair-
craft Defense were integrated fully with the observ-
ers and radar of the GUPVO. 
Regional staffs of the Passive Antiaircraft Defense 
Main Administration controlled the passive defense 
of signal and railroad installations. Because such 
installations were major targets, they were provided 
with direct communications to the air warning 
center. Special damage repair brigades were pro-
vided for them. 
Local air-raid defenses were based upon thorough 
preparation of shelters and full mobilization of the 
population. All air-raid shelters had to be approved 
by the local antiaircraft defense staff, a ~edical 
inspector, and construction organizations. 
A Passive Antiaircraft Defense Group was organ-
ized in residences or apartments for every 200 to 
500 population. One Group was organized for every 
100 to 300 population in factories and other installa-
tions. All.able-bodied men between 16 and 60 and 
all able-hodied women between 18 and 50 were sub· 
ject to compulsory service in the Fire Defense 
forces. They served in both their place of residence 
and their place of work. The sole exceptions were 
persons on active duty with the Red Army or the 
NKVD. 
Each Passive Antiaircraft Defense Group included 
a Commander, his deputy, and five detachments. 
Strengths of the detachments were 'as follows: 
Detachment Strength 
Control and observation____________________________ 6 
Fire defense_______________________________________ 9 
Anti-chemicaL_____________________________________ 5 
Repair and damage controL ___________________ ,..____ 7 
~edical___________________________________________ 4 
Each Group maintained a reserve of not less than 
25 percent of its strength. 
The Main Administration for Passive Antiaircraft 
Defense shareQ the responsibility for civilian :ldense 
training with the Osoaviakhim, the nation-wide \"01-
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untary defense association of the U. S. S. R. Joint 
training regulations and a special 40-hour training 
program were prepared. 
Fire Defense Troops were trained to form the. 
nucleus of Partisan bands should theil," area be over· 
run by the enemy. 
Section II. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT 
OF STATE SECURITY 
1. GENERAL 
The Peoples' Commissariat of State Security 
(NKGB) was organized in 1943 to assume the func-
tions of counterespionage and strategic foreign 
espionage which had been handled by a special divi-
sion of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. 
Reconnaissance, tactical espionage, and counter-
intelligence operations within the Red Army, how-
ever, were conducted by the Red Army itself. Overt 
surveillance of the civilian population and signal 
security remained functions of the NKVD. 
The NKGB is a Union-Republican Commissariat, 
but counterparts of the national organization have 
been established in few of the republics and political 
subdivisions of the U. S. S. R. 
2. ORGANIZATION 
Functions of the Commissariat of State Security are 
performed by a number of administrations and 
divisions. 
The Foreign Countries Administration organizes 
and conducts espionage outside of the U. S. S. R. 
It is believed to be composed of regional divisions. 
The Administration also is concerned with Soviet 
propaganda abroad. 
The Occupied Territories Administration super-
vised and controlled Soviet nationals in enemy-occu-
pied territory during W orld War II. It is not 
known whether this administration still exists. It 
may continue to conduct surveillance of Soviet na-
tionals in areas outside direct Red Army control. It 
is believed that this administration was concerned 
primarily with political reliability and that it took 
little or no part in the conduct of Partisan opera-
tions. 
The Secret Political Administration investigates 
anti-Soviet activities and organizations within the 
U. S. S. R. It maintains secret surveillance of the 
loyalty of Communist Party members. 
The Administration for Counterespionage in the 
Soviet Economy is charged with the responsibility of 
preventing foreign economic espionage and sabo-
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tage. It is charged with security control over indus-
trial installations and output and over the fiscal 
position of the U. S. S. R. 
The Counterintelligence Administration is con-
cerned principally with control of the activities of 
foreigners in the U. S. S. R. It also watches Soviet 
citizens of foreign birth or suspected of foreign 
affiliations. 
Other administrations and divisions of the Peo-
ples' Commissariat of State Security are charged 
with mail censorship, telephone and telegraph com-
munications, secret surveillance within prisons, etc. 
The Commissariat of State Security, unlike the 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs, maintains no 
troops or armed forces of its own. It operates 
through small groups or individuals, largely under 
cover. It has, however, official militarized status. 
Its personnel are given military rank and the privi-
leges of general officers. 
Section III. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT 
OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS 
1. GENERAL 
The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communica-
tions (NKS) , a Union-Republican Commissariat, is 
responsible for the majority of Soviet signal com-
munications systems. However, it is not responsi-
ble for combat zone communications, the internal 
communications of the Peoples' Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs, the railroad signal system, or the 
internal communications systems of the navy. It 
does include the postal, telephone, and telegraph 
services. 
The Commissariat cooperates closely·with both the 
Peoples' Commissariat of National Defense and the 
Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Its per-
sonnel were placed under full military discipline 
during World War II. 
The close relations between the Commissariats of 
Signal Communications and Defense during most of 
W orld War II were reinforced by the appointment of 
the Commissar of Signal Communications, Ivan T. 
Peresypkin, as Chief Marshal of Signal Troops and 
Chief of the Signal Division of the Red Army Gen-
eral Staff. 
2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMY COMMUNICA~ 
TIONS 
The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communica-
tions maintains and operates all communications in 
the area of army group (front) headquarters, except 
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those direct to the GHQ. The Commissariat is reo 
sponsible for the development, production, and ini· 
tial supply of Red Army signal equipment, powerful 
radio stations, charging equipment, and other oper-
ations beyond- the capabilities of Red Army signal 
troops. 
3. ORGANIZATION 
The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communica-
tions is known to include Main Administrations for 
the Postal Service, Signal Operations, and Signal 
Construction. It also includes a number of research 
and training institutes. 
Coordination with the armed forces is the respon-
sibility of the Central Military Administration of 
the Commissariat. 
Section IV. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT 
OF TRANSPORTATION 
1. GENERAL 
The Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation 
(NKPS) is an All-Union Commissariat charged 
with the maintenance and operation of all railroads, 
including the Moscow subway. 
Prior to 1931 the Commissariat controlled all 
types of transportation. During 1931, however, re-
sponsibility for all transportation other than rail was 
transferred to other commissariats. The Commis-
sariat of Transportation was militarized in April 
1943. Employees were compelled to remain on their 
jobs for the duration of the war. They were placed 
under the Red Army disciplinary code and were 
made subject to military tribunals. Special uni-
forms and military ranks were introduced in Sep-
tember 1943. 
Thirty-nine railroad divisions have been identi-
fied. Generally, they correspond to the military 
districts. 
Activities of the Peoples' Commissariat of Trans-
portation are conducted through the following 
agencies: 
Departments : 
1V-8 
Political. 
Central Operating. 
Central Locomotive. 
Central Car. 
Car and Track Maintenance. 
Signal Communications. 
New Railroad Construction. 
Central Sections: 
Supply. 
Economic Planning. 
Finance. 
Mobilization. 
Lumber. 
ElecU:ification. 
Personnel Training. 
Sanitary. 
Accounting. 
Administration. 
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Central Bureau for Foreign Relations. 
2. COORDINATION 
Coordination is effected between the Commissariat 
of Transportation and the Chief of the Rear Services 
of the Red Army, between the Chiefs of Railroad 
Divisions and the Chiefs of Transportation of the 
Rear Services of army groups (front), between the 
Chiefs of Railroad Divisions and the Chiefs of 
Transportation of military districts, and between 
the Transportation Commissariat Station Masters 
and the Railroad Station or Railhead Commandants. 
3. MOVEMENTS 
The planning and execution of major troop, supply, 
or evacuation movements by rail is the joint respon-
sibility of the Peoples' Commissariat of Transporta-
tion and the Chief of Transportation of the Rear 
Services of the Red Army. 
Major military movements normally must be 
planned 30 days in advance because of the demands 
made on the limited Soviet rail systems. The 
Transportation Commissariat must be prepared to 
inform the Red Army of its rolling stock and trans-
port capabilities 25 days before the movement. 
Twenty-three days before the movement, the Chiefs 
of Transportation of the army groups and military 
districts involved must forward their estimated re-
quirementsfor the movement to the Chief of Trans-
portation of the Rear Services of the Red Army, 
who must submit his consolidated request to the 
Commissariat of Transportation. 
Should the request exceed the estimated capabili-
ties submitted by the Commissariat, the problem is 
referred to the Supreme Economic Council or to the 
State Defense Committee for adjudication. Adjudi-
cation must be completed and a joint Commissariat-
Red Army plan must be transmitted to the Chiefs of 
Transportation of the army groups and military dis-
tricts at least 13 days before the movement. The 
Chiefs of Transportation and the Railroad Divisions 
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must have prepared their detailed joint plans and 
must have transmitted them as warning orders to 
military formations, railroad units, and industrial 
enterprises concerned at least 10 days before the 
movement. 
4. RESPONSIBILITY 
The maintenance of epidemiological and epizootic 
control on all railroads is a special responsibility of 
the Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation. The 
Commissariat maintains medical and veterinary 
inspectors on all trains and special infectious hos· 
pitals at major stations and all railheads. The Main 
Medical Administration and the Veterinary Admin· 
istration of the Red Army share in this responsi. 
bility. 
The Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation is 
responsible for the operation of all railroads up to 
army railheads. It is responsible for all permanent 
and heavy construction, even in advance of army 
railheads. The Railroad Construction Battalions of 
the Red Army are, however, responsible for initial 
mine clearance. 
Coordination between the Chiefs of Railroad Divi· 
sions and the Chiefs of Transportation of military 
districts is limited to planning, epidemiological and 
epizootic control, and supervision of the Transporta' 
tion Commissariat Station Masters and the Station 
Commandants. 
Station masters have sole authority over the oper-
ations of railroad lines, rolling stock repair, rail line 
construction and repair, and railroad signal com-
munications. 
Station and railhead commandants of the Red 
Army are responsible for the orderly loading and 
unloading of troops, equipment, and supplies, the 
successful operation and maintenance of Red Army 
dumps and depots, and the active defense of stations. 
They exercise the disciplinary authority of garrison 
commanders over all troops and other personnel in 
transit or at stations. In defensive situations, it is 
believed that they have tactical command over all 
personnel in their sectors, including Transportation 
Commissariat Troops, Railroad and Convoy Troops, 
and the local Passive Antiaircraft Defense Groups 
(in the zone of interior) . 
Section V. SEMI-MILITARY TRAINING 
ORGANIZATIONS 
1. GENERAL 
Appreciation of the necessity for widespread interest 
and voluntary participation in military activities 
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outside of the official organizations of the army 
dates from 1912, when a national society was organ. 
ized for semi-military training. Following the Revo-
lution, many Soviet citizens and the Communist 
Party realized the need for supplementing the limited 
conscript training of the Red Army of the early 
twenties. Consequently, various societies were 
formed to accomplish this function. 
The societies were merged in 1926 into the Or-
ganization for the Defense of the Soviet Union and 
Defense against Air Raids and Chemical Attack 
(Osoaviakhim,\ . The Komsomol (League of Com. 
munist Youth) and its children's affiliates, the Pio· 
neers and the Octobrists, formed the core of Osoa· 
viakhim. Defense training outside of the army be-
came virtually compulsory for Soviet youth. 
Although Osoaviakhim, and particularly its 
Komsomol, achieved considerable success, the status 
of universal military preparedness was not satisfac-
tory at the beginning of the war with Germany. 
Consequently, military control and compulsory par-
ticipation in prescribed training courses were insti-
tuted in 1941 with the organization of the Main 
Administration for Universal Compulsory Military 
Training of the Citizens of the U. S. S. R. (Vsevo-
buch) of the Peoples' Commissariat of Defense. 
Osoaviakhim was relegated to a secondary and 
supplementary role for the duration of W orId War 
II. The State Defense Committee required the or· 
ganization to turn its facilities over to the newly 
formed Vsevobuch. Osoaviakhim conducted pas-
sive antiaircraft and elementary aviation training, 
conducted war-bond drives, and assisted in mine 
clearance and collection of enemy weapons and 
equipment in recaptured areas. With the conclu-
sion of the war and the termination of Vsevobuch, 
Osoaviakhim once more is the primary auxiliary 
military training organization of the U. S. S. R. 
2. OSOAVIAKHIM AND KOMSOMOL 
Osoaviakhim is comprised of a pyramidal series of 
local, o blast, and republican organizations. It is 
directed by the All-Union Presidium. 
The organization expanded rapidly following its 
formation. Its membership totaled 2,950,000 in 
October 1927 and reached 13,000,000 in 1941. As 
early as 1929, there were 47,200 organized groups 
for the study of military science. Osoaviakhim was 
actively engaged in aviation training. In 1931, it 
had 14 glider stations, 40 airfields, flying schools, 
model airplane shops, and centers for training avia-
tion mechanics. 
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Although Osoaviakhim was designed to provide 
military and physical training for citizens of pre-con-
script age, it also included former members of the 
Red Army who wished to study new technical de-
velopments in warfare. Its program, which cen-
tered about clubs and training centers, included 
virtually all types of military training. 
Markedly close relations are maintained between 
Osoaviakhim, the state, the Communist Party, and 
the armed forces. The Soviet government has 
supported the organization strongly. It has author-
ized the use of army reserve personnel, giving them 
active pay duty. 
The organization of Osoaviakhim has been 
changed for peacetime operations. The clubs have 
been replaced by military-type units, infantry or 
cavalry squads or platoons and detachments of spe-
cialists. The Communist Party supervises the selec-
tion of unit commanders, often reserve officers or 
noncommissioned officers on deferred status. 
The Komsomol of the Communist Party special-
izes in tank, artillery, and marksmanship training. 
Red Army personnel on active duty often have served 
as its officers. 
3. VSEVOBUCH 
The Main Administration for Universal Compulsory 
Military Training of the Citizens of the U. S. S. R. 
(Vsevobuch) , which existed between 1941 and 1945, 
had the mission of providing a reserve for the Red 
Army and for Partisan operations. It conducted 
training for all male citizens between the ages of 
16 and 60. 
A special 110-hour training program was given 
trainees during their off-duty hours, without inter-
ruption of production and without pay. Regulations 
provided that the program must be completed in not 
more than 5 months and that classes must meet at 
least twice a week. Instruction was presented by 
reserve officers and noncommissioned officers re-
cruited from wounded Red Army personnel. Train-
ing was specialized by arm. Insofar as was practi-
cable, the training organizations corresponded to 
units and elements of the Red Army, but had no 
military status. 
The program achieved only partial success due to 
the inadequate supply of instructors and equipment. 
Best results appear to have been achieved in the 
initial training of specialists, such as signal men 
whose courses extended far beyond the initial 110 
hours. 
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Section VI. PARTISANS 
1. DEVELOPMENT AND MISSION 
Partisan operations have always been an important 
factor in wars fought on Soviet territory. The large, 
inaccessible areas and the robustness of the Soviet 
population favor this type of operation. 
The mission of Partisan warfare is to harass 
enemy forces, to cut their extended supply and com-
munication lines, to assist Red Army operations, and 
to gather information about the enemy. 
The Soviet government and the Communist Party, 
with the Komsomol, made preparations before 
World War II for the foundation of a Partisan move-
ment. The Osoaviakhim and the Fire Defense 
Troops assisted in this preparation, and later in the 
actual organization of Partisan bands. V sevobuch 
also assisted in the formation of Partisan bands after 
1941. 
During World War II, the development of Par-
tisan bands was greatly facilitated by the German 
Army's inability to mop up the large territories cap-
tured during its rapid advance. Special recruiting 
agencies of the Communist Party in the rear of the 
enemy forces furnished the Partisans. with a steady 
flow of replacements. It is estimated that more 
than 300,000 Partisans were operating behind Ger-
man lines at the end of 1943. 
The Soviet Partisan command also assisted Parti-
san bands in other countries under German occupa-
tion, such as Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and Poland. 
2. HIGH COMMAND AND COORDINATION WITH 
RED ARMY 
The Communist Party supervised and controlled the 
Partisans. The High Command of the Partisans 
was the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement, first 
under Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov and 
later under General· Leitenant Ponomarenko. The 
Staff is responsible directly to the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party. 
The Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was 
represented in the General Headquarters and coor-
dinated with the Operations and Intelligence Divi-
sion of the Red Army to assure closest cooperation 
with the Red Army. 
When the Red Army went on the offensive, much 
closer coordination was required. Special Partisan 
staffs were organized at army group (front) and 
army levels to achieve this coordination (fig. 3). 
The Operations Staff of the Partisan Movement in 
the Rear of the Enemy was organized in enemy-
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Figure 3. Structure and organization 0/ Soviet Partisans, Communist Party control 0/ Partisans, and lateral liaison with 
Red Army headquarters. 
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occupied territory to receive orders from the Parti-
san High Command and to assure the dissemination 
of orders to individual Partisan bands. 
3. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 
The organization, equipment, and strength of Par-
tisan bands varied greatly. They depended upon 
terrain conditions, density of the road net, and the 
strength of enemy forces. 
The most commonly found unit was the Partisan 
battalion (Otryad), with 200 to 400 officers and 
enlisted men. In favorable terrain, battalions were 
often combined into brigades and, early in the war, 
into regiments (Polk). In very few instances, Par-
tisan divisions (Divisia) were organized. 
Partisan units were composed of personnel re-
ceived from the Communist Party and semi-military 
organizations, of isolated Red Army soldiers, and of 
escaped prisoners of war. 
The types and quantity of weapons, equipment, 
and supplies used by the Partisans, largely depended 
upon the initiative of the units and the success of 
Partisan raids on enemy supply depots and columns. 
Battlefields also were a source of supply. 
Partisans normally did not receive supplies from 
the Red Army or the Soviet government, except for 
medical supplies usually delivered by air. When 
Partisan units were in contact with Red Army units, 
however, they were able to obtain equipment. 
Most of the food for the Partisans was obtained 
from the local population and was supplemented by 
supplies seized from enemy dumps. They generally 
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had sufficient supplies of weapons. Limited trans-
portation was available to Partisans. It normally 
consisted of light horse-drawn carts. 
4. TACTICS 
In general, the Partisans operated on orders from 
the Partisan High Command to carry out specific 
operations. When the Red Army went on the offen-
sive, Partisan units usually were confined to opera-
tions which gave direct assistance to the advance 
elements of Red Army assault forces. They also 
assisted the Red Army by gathering information 
about the enemy, often employing children, women, 
and the aged for these missions. 
Surprise raids and ambushes were characteristic 
Partisan operations. They usually operated at night, 
often near woods and marshes. Partisan bands nor-
mally avoided engagements with strong enemy 
forces. After a successful raid, they returned to 
their bases by separate routes. They continually 
changed their positions, marching by night and hid-
ing by day. 
When Partisan units were surrounded, they broke 
up into small groups which attempted to pass 
through the enemy lines or hid in the surrounded 
area. 
Partisan units employed a markedly effective 
security system of sentries, patrols, and advance 
observation posts. Roads leading to their camps 
normally were camouflaged and mined. Excellent 
communications were maintained by the use of radio 
and messengers. 
